Abstract. Group signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, aiming to protect anonymity and ensure accountability of users. It allows group members to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to identify the signer of any suspected signature. Most of the existing group signature schemes, however, do not guarantee security once users' secret keys are exposed. To reduce potential damages caused by key exposure attacks, Song (ACMCCS 2001) put forward the concept of forward-secure group signatures (FSGS). Nakanishi, Hira, and Funabiki (Pairing 2009) then defined a rigourous security model of FSGS for static groups, and demonstrated a pairing-based instantiation satisfying the model. Subsequently, Libert and Yung (ASIACCS 2010) extended Nakanishi et al.'s work to handle dynamically growing groups. For the time being, all known secure FSGS schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions, and are vulnerable against quantum computers.
Introduction
Group signatures. Initially introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [21] , group signature allows members of a group controlled by a manager to sign messages anonymously in the name of the group (anonymity). Nevertheless, there is a tracing mechanism to identify the signer of any signature in case of disputes (traceability). These two appealing features allow group signatures to find applications in various real-life scenarios, such as digital right management, anonymous online communications, e-commerce systems, and much more. On the theoretical front, designing secure and efficient group signature schemes is interesting and challenging, since those advanced constructions usually require a sophisticated combination of carefully chosen cryptographic ingredients: digital signatures, encryption schemes, and zero-knowledge protocols. In the last quarter-century, an abundance of group signature schemes with different security models, different levels of efficiency and functionality have been proposed (e.g., [5, 6, 11, 15, 30, 43] ). Unfortunately, the exposure of group signing keys renders almost all the existing schemes unsatisfactory in practice, in the sense that the security of the scheme is no longer guaranteed when the key exposure happens. So now let us look at key exposure problem and the countermeasures to this problem.
Exposure of Group Signing Keys and Forward-Secure Group Signatures. Exposure of users' secret keys is one of the greatest dangers to many cryptographic protocols in practice [59] . Forward-secure mechanisms, aiming to minimize the damages caused by secret key exposures, were first introduced by Anderson [4] . Since then, many forward-secure cryptosystems were constructed, such as forward-secure signatures [4, 7, 1, 31] , forward-secure public key encryption systems [23, 18, 10] , and forward-secure signatures with un-trusted update [14, 44, 45] . At the heart of these schemes is a key evolving technique that operates as follows. It divides the lifetime of the scheme into discrete T time periods. Upon entering a new time period, a subsequent secret key is computed from the current secret key via a one-way key-evolution algorithm and the current one is deleted promptly. By the property of the one-way algorithm, the security of previous keys is preserved even when current secret key is exposed to the adversary. Therefore, by carefully choosing a secure scheme that operates well with a key evolving mechanism, forward-security of the scheme can be guaranteed.
As investigated by Song [59] , secret key exposure in group signatures is much more damaging than in ordinary digital signatures. In group signatures, if one group member's signing key is exposed to the attacker, then the latter can sign arbitrary messages. Under this circumstance, if the underlying group signature scheme is not secure against exposure of group signing keys, then the whole system has to be re-initialized, which is obviously unsuitable in practice. Furthermore, it renders all previously signed group signatures invalid since we do not have a mechanism to distinguish whether a signature is generated by a legitimate group member or by the attacker. This seriously violates the traceability property that group signatures are supposed to offer. Note that this kind of violation cannot be even solved by simply re-initializing the whole system. In fact, one of the easiest way for a misbehaving member Eve to repudiate her illegally signed signatures (i.e., to violate the traceability) is to reveal her group signing key secretly in the Internet and then claim to be a victim of the key exposure problem [31] . Now the users who had accepted signatures before Eve's group signing key is exposed are now at the mercy of all the group members, some of whom (e.g., Eve) would not reissue the signatures with the newly changed key. Therefore, traceability of group signatures is no longer guaranteed.
The aforementioned problems induced by the exposure of group signing keys motivated Song [59] to consider the concept of forward-secure group signatures (FSGS), where group members are able to update their group signing keys at each time period via a one-way key-evolution algorithm. Therefore, when some group member's singing key is compromised, all the signatures generated during past periods remain valid. Furthermore, FSGS prevent dishonest group members from repudiating signatures generated during past periods by simply exposing keys. Later, Nakanishi, Hira, Funabiki [53] defined a rigourous security model of FSGS for static groups, where users are fixed throughout the scheme, and first achieved logarithmic complexity in total number of time periods T for all algorithms and for sizes of all parameters. Subsequently, Libert and Yung [46] extended Nakanishi et al.'s work to capture the setting of the dynamically growing groups. Their scheme achieves better efficiency than all previous schemes. More precisely, signature size, signing and verification costs do not depend on number of time periods T and other metrics are at most log-squared complexity in T . However, all these schemes are constructions based on number-theoretic assumptions and are fragile in the presence of quantum adversaries. In order not to put all eggs in one basket, it is imperative to consider instantiations based on alternative, post-quantum foundations, e.g., lattice assumptions. In view of this, let us now look at the topic of lattice-based group signatures.
Lattice-based group signatures. Lattice-based cryptography has been an exciting research area since the seminal works of Regev [57] and Gentry et al. [26] . Lattices not only allow to build powerful primitives (e.g., [25, 27] ) that have no feasible instantiations in conventional number-theoretic cryptography, but they also provide several advantages over the latter, such as conjectured resistance against quantum adversaries and faster arithmetic operations. Along with other primitives, lattice-based group signature has received noticeable attention in recent years. The first scheme was introduced by Gordon, Katz and Vaikuntanathan [28] whose solution produced signature size linear in the number of group users N . Camenisch et al. [17] then extended [28] to achieve anonymity in the strongest sense. Later, Laguillaumie et al. [36] put forward the first scheme with the signature size logarithmic in N , at the cost of relatively large parameters. Simpler and more efficient solutions with O(log N ) signature size were subsequently given by Nguyen et al. [54] and Ling et al. [48] . Libert et al. [41] obtained substantial efficiency improvements via a construction based on Merkle trees which eliminates the need for GPV trapdoors [26] . More recently, a scheme supporting message-dependent opening (MDO) feature [58] was proposed in [42] . All the schemes mentioned above are designed for static groups.
Three lattice-based group signatures that have certain dynamic features were proposed by Langlois et al. [37] , Libert et al. [38] , and Ling et al. [49] . The first one is a scheme with verifier-local revocation (VLR) [12] , which means that only the verifiers need to download the up-to-date group information. The second one addresses the orthogonal problem of dynamic user enrollments, which was formalized by Kiayias and Yung [35] and by Bellare et al. [8] . The third one is a fully dynamic scheme that supports both features, following Bootle et al.'s model [13] .
For the time being, there is no forward-secure group signatures from lattice assumptions. Considering the great threat of key exposure to group signatures and the vulnerability of group signatures from number-theoretic assumptions in front of quantum adversaries, it would be desirable to investigate the design of (non-trivial) lattice-based forward-secure group signatures. Furthermore, it would be inspiring to achieve it with reasonable overhead, e.g., with complexity at most poly-logarithmic in T .
Our Contributions. We introduce the first forward-secure group signature scheme from lattices. The scheme works in Nakanishi et al.'s model [53] . Under the Short Integer Solution (SIS) assumption and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, our scheme achieves full anonymity and a stronger notion of traceability named forward-secure traceability, which captures the traceability in the setting of key exposure problems and was formally defined in [53] . Like all previous lattice-based group signatures, our scheme is proven to be secure in the random oracle model.
For a security parameter λ, maximum number of group members N , and total time periods T , our scheme features group public key size O(λ 2 (log N + log T )), signature size O(λ(log N +log T )) and secret key size O(λ 2 (log N +log T ) 2 log T ). In Table 1 , we give a detailed comparison of our scheme with known latticebased group signatures that are not forward-secure, in terms of efficiency and functionality. Overview of Our Techniques. As we discussed earlier, designing secure group signatures typically requires a combination of digital signatures, encryption schemes and zero-knowledge protocols. To realize forward-secure group signatures, we further need a mechanism to update the group signing key periodically and a zero-knowledge protocol to prove that the key updating procedure is done honestly.
To start with, we utilize the Bonsai tree signature scheme [20] as one of three essential ingredients in constructing our forward-secure group signature scheme. Consider a group of N = 2 ℓ users, where each user is identified by a string id ∈ {0, 1} ℓ that is the binary representation of this user's index in the group. Let n, m, β and q ≥ 2 be positive integers (to be determined later). The main structure of our scheme is a Bonsai tree, specified by a matrix
and a vector u. Initially, each user with identity id is issued a Bonsai signature on his identity as his group signing key, which is a small vector v id ∈ Z (ℓ+1)m such that A id · v id = u mod q and
]. The scheme then follows the usual sign-then-encrypt-then-prove approach for constructing group signatures. When signing messages, the user id first encrypts his identity id to a ciphertext c via a CCA-secure encryption scheme obtained by utilizing the CHK technique [19] to the identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme by Gentry et al. [26] proves in zero-knowledge that: (i) he is a certified group member, in other words, he owns a Bonsai signature on his identity id; (ii) c is a correct encryption of id. The zero-knowledge protocol for fact (i) is developed from Langlois et al.'s technique [37] for proving possession of a valid message-signature pair for the Bonsai signature (which was also employed by Cheng et al. [22] in the context of policy-based signatures). Meanwhile, to prove fact (ii) in zero-knowledge, we rely on the decomposition-extension-permutation technique by Ling et al. [47] , which is known to be well-suited for handling LWE-based relations [48, 39, 40] . The modular construction we discussed above actually only yields a group signature that is not forward-secure. To upgrade it into a forward-secure one, we employ the following two techniques/modifications. First, we exploit the hierarchical structure of the Bonsai tree to enable periodical key updating. Let T = 2 d be the total number of time periods. Now, each user id is additionally associated with a subtree of depth d, specified by the matrices A
ℓ+dz ], and let S id z be a trapdoor matrix such that A id z · S id z = 0 mod q. Group signing key of user id at time t consists of {S id z , z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) 1 } while group signing key at time t ′ > t consists of {S id z ′ , z ′ ∈ Nodes (t ′ →T −1) } such that for any z ′ ∈ Nodes (t ′ →T −1) , there exists an ancestor z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) . Thanks to the basis delegation algorithm from [20] , users are able to derive keys for the descendent of node z, and hence, to update their signing keys periodically. Furthermore, by the one-way property of the basis delegation algorithm, prior signing keys are guaranteed to be secure even when the current one is compromised. We remark that the above updating technique follows from previous works by Nakanishi, Hira and Funabiki [53] and Libert and Yung [46] , which were inspired from [18, 10, 14] .
Second, we modify the signing algorithm to capture the key-evolution procedure. Specifically, when signing a message at time t, of which the binary representation is z, user id now proves in zero-knowledge that: (i) he is a certified group member; (ii) he has done the key-evolution honestly; (iii) c is a correct encryption of id. We note that fact (iii) can be handled in the same manner as in the basic scheme discussed earlier. So the question has reduced to how to handle facts (i) and (ii). To this end, we observe that it is sufficient for user id to prove knowledge of a small vector v id z such that A id z · v id z = u mod q. Note that when proving knowledge of such a short vector, id should be kept hidden while z is part of public input, therefore the problem reduces to proving knowledge of short vectors v id and w 2 , and a binary string id satisfying:
To handle this statement, we utilize Langlois et al.'s technique for the Bonsai signature to prove knowledge of v id and id, and adapt Ling et al.'s decompositionextension-permutation technique [47] to prove knowledge of w 2 . Finally, the protocol is transformed into a signature via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [24] .
To summarize, by incorporating a key updating mechanism into a secure group signature scheme, we constructed a forward-secure group signature scheme from lattices. Our scheme satisfies full anonymity thanks to the CCA-security of the underlying encryption scheme and the statistical zero-knowledge of the underlying zero-knowledge protocol, and achieves forward-secure traceability thanks to the security of the Bonsai tree structure. We believe that, our construction -while not being truly practical -would certainly help to enrich the field of lattice-based group signatures, and that our design approach may be of independent interest. Concurrent Work. Recently, Kansal, Dutta and Mukhopadhyay [33] proposed a forward-secure group signature scheme from lattices in the model of Libert and Yung [46] . Unfortunately, it can be observed that their proposed scheme does not satisfy the correctness and security requirements. (For details, see Appendix B.) Therefore, constructing forward-secure group signatures from lattices for dynamic groups remains an open problem.
Organization. In Section 2, we recall some background on forward-secure group signatures, lattice-based cryptography, the bonsai tree signature scheme, and Stern-like zero-knowledge protocols. In Section 3, our main scheme is constructed and analyzed. Section 4 describes the main zero-knowledge protocol used in our construction. Some details are deferred to the Appendix.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this paper, all vectors are column vectors. The column concatenation of matrices A ∈ R n×m and B ∈ R n×k is denoted by [A|B] ∈ R n×(m+k) while the concatenation of two (column) vectors x ∈ R m and y ∈ R k is denoted by (x y) ∈ R m+k . Let · and · ∞ be the Euclidean (ℓ 2 ) norm and infinity (ℓ ∞ ) norm of a vector, respectively. For a ∈ R, log a denotes logarithm of a with base 2. 
Security Model of Forward-Secure Group Signature Scheme
We recall the definition and security notions of forward-secure group signatures (FSGS), as presented by Nakanishi et al. [53] . An FSGS scheme involves two authorities: a group manager (GM) who manages the group and a tracing manager (TM) who can identify the signer of any signature. The lifetime of an FSGS scheme is divided into T discrete periods 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. At each time period t, the secret key of group member i is denoted as usk t [i] . To enable forwardsecurity, after each update, the old key is assumed to be discarded promptly. An FSGS scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms.
KeyGen: This randomized key generation algorithm takes as input a tuple (λ, T, N ), where λ is the security parameter, T is the total number of time periods, and N is the maximum number of group members. It then returns gpk, msk, mosk and usk 0 , where gpk is the group public key, msk is the secret key of GM, mosk is the secret key of TM, and usk 0 is an array of the initial N secret signing keys {usk Correctness. The above scheme must satisfy the following correctness requirement: For all λ, T, N , all (gpk, msk, mosk,
, the following equations hold:
Forward-Secure Traceability. This requirement demands that any PPT adversary, even if it can corrupt the tracing manager and some (or all) group members, is not able to create a valid signature (i) that is traced to one non-corrupted user or (ii) that is traced to one corrupted user, but the signature is signed at time period preceding the secret key query of this corrupted user. Note that (i) captures the standard traceability requirement as in [6] while (ii) deals with the new requirement in the context of forward-security. Details are modelled in the experiment in Fig. 1 . In the experiment, the adversary can adaptively choose
* by querying its signing oracle, and
Fig. 1:
Experiment used to define forward-secure traceability of an FSGS scheme.
which user to corrupt, when to corrupt and when to halt, and when to output its forgery. Furthermore, it is allowed to query signature on any message of a member i through the signing oracle Sign( Full Anonymity. This requirement requires that it is infeasible for any PPT adversary to distinguish which of two signers of its choice signed the challenged message of its choice at time period t of its choice. Details of this requirement is modelled in the experiment in Fig. 2 . In the experiment, the adversary is accessible to secret keys of all group members and GM, and can query the signer of any signature except for the challenged one obtained from the opening oracle Open(mosk, ·).
Define the advantage Adv
Define Adv 
Experiment Exp
Anon FSGS,A (λ, T, N ) (gpk, msk, mosk, usk0) ← KeyGen(λ, T, N ), (st, t, i0, i1, M ) ← A Open(mosk,·) (choose, gpk, msk, usk0), b ← {0, 1}, Σ ← Sign(gpk, uskt[i b ], t, M ), b ′ ← A Open(mosk,·) (guess, st, Σ), If b ′ = b then return 1, Else return 0.
Some Background on Lattices
Let n ∈ Z + and Λ be an n-dimensional lattice over
be the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of S. We refer to S as the Gram-Schmidt norm of S. For any c ∈ R n and σ ∈ R + , define the following:
) and ρ σ,c (Λ) = x∈Λ ρ σ,c (x) for any x ∈ Λ. Define the discrete Gaussian distribution over the lattice Λ with parameter σ and center c to be
Let n, m, q be positive integers with q ≥ 2. For A ∈ Z n×m q and u ∈ Z n q in the subgroup of Z n q generated by the columns of A, define
Note that we can define discrete Gaussian distribution over the set Λ u (A) in a similar way:
In the following, we review some facts about discrete Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 1 ([26,56]).
Let n and q ≥ 2 be positive integers and let m ≥ 2n log q and σ ≥ ω( √ log m).
-Then for all but a 2q −n fraction of all A ∈ Z n×m q , the distribution of the syndrome u = A · e mod q is statistically close to uniform over
We now recall two hard average-case problems: the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem (in the ℓ ∞ norm) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. If m, β = poly(n) and q > β √ n, then the average-case SIS ∞ n,m,q,β problem (in the ℓ ∞ norm) is at least as hard as the worst-case SIVP γ problem for some γ = β · O( √ nm) (see [26, 51] ). Let q = poly(n) be a prime power, B ≥ √ n · ω(log n), γ = O(nq/B) and χ is a B-bounded distribution over Z, then the average-case LWE n,q,χ problem is at least as hard as the worst-case SIVP γ problem (see e.g., [57, 55] ). Now let us recall some algorithms from previous works that will be used extensively in this work. The TrapGen algorithm is used to generate a matrix A that is statistically close to uniform together with a short basis of the lattice Λ ⊥ (A). The SampleD algorithm employs a short basis of
Lemma 2 ([3]). Let n and q ≥ 2 be positive integers and m = O(n log q).
There is a PPT algorithm TrapGen(n, m, q) that outputs a tuple (A, S) such that -A is statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q , -S is a basis for Λ ⊥ (A), i.e., A · S = 0 mod q, and 
Lemma 3 ([26]). Let
We also need the following two algorithms to securely delegate basis. [50] proposed more efficient mechanisms for this combined task and also for the TrapGen and SampleD algorithms, which is desired in practice, but for simplicity here, we present our scheme using the above ones.
Lemma 4 ([20]
∈ Z m ′ ×m ′ of Λ ⊥ (A ′ ) with S ′ = S .
Lemma 5 ([20]). Let S be a basis of an m-dimensional integer lattice Λ and a parameter s
≥ ω( √ log n) · S .
The Bonsai Tree Signature Scheme
Our construction builds on the bonsai tree signature scheme proposed by Cash et al. [20] . Now we describe it briefly. The scheme takes the following parameters: λ is the security parameter and n = O(λ), ℓ is the message length, integer q = poly(n) is sufficiently large, To sign a binary message id ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , the signer first computes the ma-
, and then outputs a vector v ∈ Λ u (A id ) via SampleD(ExtBasis(S 0 , A id ), u, s). To verify the validity of v on message id, the verifier computes A id as above and checks if A id · v = u mod q and 0 < v ∞ ≤ β hold. They proved that this signature scheme is existential unforgeable under static chosen message attacks based on the hardness of the SIS prblem.
Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems and Stern-like Protocols
We will work with statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, namely, interactive protocols where the zero-knowledge property holds against any cheating verifier, while the soundness property only holds against computationally bounded cheating provers. More formally, let the set of statements-witnesses R = {(y, w)} ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be an NP relation. A two-party game P, V is called an interactive argument system for the relation R with soundness error e if the following conditions hold:
An argument system is called statistical zero-knowledge if there exists a PPT simulator S(y) having oracle access to any V(y) and producing a simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one of the real interaction between P(y, w) and V(y). A related notion is argument of knowledge, which requires the witness-extended emulation property. For protocols consisting of 3 moves (i.e., commitment-challenge-response), witness-extended emulation is implied by special soundness [29] , where the latter assumes that there exists a PPT extractor which takes as input a set of valid transcripts with respect to all possible values of the "challenge" to the same "commitment", and outputs w ′ such that (y, w ′ ) ∈ R.
Stern-like protocols. The statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge presented in this work are Stern-like [60] protocols. In particular, they are Σ-protocols in the generalized sense defined in [32, 9] (where 3 valid transcripts are needed for extraction, instead of just 2). The basic protocol consists of 3 moves: commitment, challenge, response. If a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme, such as the KTX scheme [34] , is employed in the first move, then one obtains a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) with perfect completeness, constant soundness error 2/3. In many applications, the protocol is repeated κ = ω(log n) times to make the soundness error negligibly small in n.
An abstraction of Stern's protocol. We recall an abstraction of Stern's protocol, proposed in [38] . Let K, L, q be positive integers, where L ≥ K and q ≥ 2, and let VALID be a subset of {−1, 0, 1} L . Suppose that S is a finite set such that one can associate every φ ∈ S with a permutation Γ φ of L elements, satisfying the following conditions:
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γ φ (w) is uniform in VALID.
(
We aim to construct a statistical ZKAoK for the following abstract relation: The interaction between prover P and verifier V is described in Fig. 3 . The protocol employs a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme COM from [34] .
Theorem 1 ([38]).
Assume that COM is a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme. Then, the protocol in Fig. 3 is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O(L log q). In particular:
-There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M, u), outputs an accepted transcript statistically close to that produced by the real prover. tw, tr, ρ2, ρ3 ).
-Ch = 2: Let φ2 = φ, w2 = w + rw mod q, and RSP = (φ2, w2, ρ1, ρ3 ).
-Ch = 3: Let φ3 = φ, w3 = rw, and RSP = (φ3, w3, ρ1, ρ2) .
Verification:
Receiving RSP, the verifier proceeds as follows:
-Ch = 1: Check that tw ∈ VALID, C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tw +tr mod q; ρ3).
In each case, the verifier outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. The proof of the Theorem 1, appeared in [38] , employs standard simulation and extraction techniques for Stern-like protocols [34, 47] . For completeness, we recall the proof in Appendix A.
Our Lattice-Based Forward-Secure Group Signature
In the description below, for a binary tree of depth k, we identify each node at depth j with a binary vector z of length j such that z [1] In our forward-secure group signature scheme, lifetime of the scheme is divided into T discrete periods 0, 1, · · · , T − 1. For simplicity, let T = 2 d for some positive integer d. Following previous works [14, 46] , time is arranged as the leaves of a binary tree of depth d in chronological order. More precisely, each time period t is associated with leave Bin(t).
Following [14] , for j = 1, · · · , d + 1, t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1}, we define a time period's "right sibling at depth j" as
Define node set Nodes (t→T −1) to be {sibling(1, t), · · · , sibling(d + 1, t)}. For any t ′ > t, one can check that for any non-⊥ z ′ ∈ Nodes (t ′
⊤ is an ancestor of z ′ .
Description of the Scheme
Our scheme works in the Nakanishi et al.'s (static) model [53] . Let the total number of time periods be T = 2 d and the maximum expected number of group members be N = 2 ℓ . The group public key consists of (i) a Bonsai tree of depth
and a vector u ∈ Z n q , which is used to generate group signing keys; (ii) A public matrix B ∈ Z n×m q of the IBE scheme by Gentry et al. [26] , which is used to encrypt user identities when signing messages. The secret key of the group manager is the corresponding trapdoor matrix of the Bonsai tree while the secret key of the tracing manager is the corresponding trapdoor matrix of the IBE scheme.
Each user id ∈ {0, 1} ℓ is assigned a node id. To enable periodical key updating, each user id is associated with a subtree of depth d. In our scheme, all users are assumed to be valid group members from time 0 to T − 1. Let z be a binary string of length
. Specifically, the initial group signing key of user id at time t is {S id z , z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) }, which satisfies A id z · S id z = 0 mod q. Thanks to the basis delegation technique [20] , users are able to compute the trapdoor matrices for all the descendent of nodes in the set Nodes (t→T −1) and hence are able to derive all the subsequent signing keys. We remark that since we do not need to delegate basis for leave nodes, we generate short vectors v id Bin(t) instead of S id Bin(t) in the group signing key for all t.
Once received the group signing key, each user can issue signatures on behalf of the group. When signing a message at time t, user id first generates a one-time signature key pair (ovk, osk), and then encrypts his identity id to a ciphertext c using the IBE scheme with respect to "identity" ovk. Next, he proves in zero-knowledge that: (i) he is a certified group member; (ii) he has done keyevolution honestly; (iii) c is a correct encryption of id. To prove that facts (i) and (ii) hold, it is sufficient to prove knowledge of a short vector v id Bin(t) such that A id Bin(t) · v id Bin(t) = u mod q. The protocol is developed from Langlois et al.'s technique [37] and Ling et al.'s technique [47] , and is repeated κ = ω(log n) times to achieve negligible soundness error, and is made non-interactive via FiatShamir transform [24] as a triple Π. Finally, the user generates a one-time signature sig on the pair (c, Π), and outputs the group signature consisting of (c, Π, sig).
To verify a group signature, one simply checks the validity of sig and Π. In case of dispute, the tracing manager can decrypt the ciphertext with respect to the "identity" ovk using his secret key. Details of the scheme are described below.
KeyGen(λ, T, N ): On inputs security parameter λ, total number of time periods T = 2 d for some d ∈ Z + and maximum number of group members N = 2 ℓ for some ℓ ∈ Z + , this algorithm does the following: for all i ∈ [k] and b ∈ {0, 1}. 4. Choose a one-time signature scheme OT S = (OGen, OSign, OVer), and a statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment scheme COM from [34] that will be used in our zero-knowledge argument system.
Let
and H 1 : {0, 1} * → {1, 2, 3} κ be collisionresistant hash functions, which will be modelled as random oracles in the security analysis.
Choose Gaussian parameter s
that is used to generate short bases or sample short vectors at level i for i ∈ {ℓ, ℓ + 1, · · · , k}.
Choose integer bounds
, and let χ be a B-bounded distribution over Z. 
and proceed as follows:
-If z is of length less than d, i.e., 1
, z ∈ Nodes (0→T −1) } be the initial secret key of user i. Let public parameter be pp, group public key be gpk, secret key of GM be msk, secret key of TM be mosk and initial secret key be usk 0 , which are defined as follows:
KeyUpdate(gpk, usk t [i], i, t + 1): Compute the identifier of user i as id = Bin(i), parse usk t [i] = {usk t [i][z]
, z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) }, and determine the node set
Otherwise, there exists exactly one z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) as its prefix, i.e., z ′ = z y for some suffix y. Consider the following two cases.
If z
2. If z ′ = z y for some non-empty y, then usk t [i][z] = S id z . Consider the following two subcases.
-If z ′ is of length d, run
-If z ′ is of length less than d, run
Output updated key as usk t+1
Sign(gpk, usk t [i], i, t, M ): Compute the identifier id = Bin(i).
By the structure of the node set Nodes (t→T −1) , there exists some z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) such that z = Bin(t) is of length d and usk
To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer then performs the following steps.
1. First, generate a one-time signature key pair (ovk, osk) ← OGen(n), and then encrypt id with respect to "identity" ovk as follows.
. Sample s ←֓ χ n , e 1 ←֓ χ m , e 2 ←֓ χ ℓ , and compute ciphertext (c 1 ,
2. Second, compute the matrix A id z and generate a NIZKAoK Π to demonstrate the possession of a valid tuple (2) hold with s ∞ ≤ B, e 1 ∞ ≤ B and e 2 ∞ ≤ B. This is done by running the argument system described in Section 4.2 with public input
and witness tuple ξ as above. The protocol is repeated κ = ω(log n) times to obtain negligible soundness error and made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [24] as a triple 
Then use S to compute a small norm matrix F ovk ∈ Z m×ℓ such that B · F ovk = G mod q. This is done by computing f i ← SampleD(B, S, g i , s ℓ ) for all i ∈ [ℓ] and let
Remark 2. Note that Song [59] and Libert and Yung [46] consider a mechanism that deals with time-limited group membership, where each user i is only a valid group member from time t i,1 to t i,2 . In our construction, for simplicity, we only consider fixed group membership from time 0 to T − 1 as in the work by Nakanishi et al. [53] . However, our construction can directly cater to timelimited group membership as in [59, 46] without any extra overhead. This can be done by generating secret key to be {usk (ti,1→ti,2) [i][z], z ∈ Nodes (ti,1→ti,2) } for user i with group membership from t i,1 to t i,2 in the KeyGen algorithm.
Analysis of the Scheme
Efficiency. We first analyze the complexity of the scheme described in Section 3.1, with respect to security parameter λ and parameters ℓ = log N and
-The group public key gpk has bit-size O(λ 2 · k).
-The user secret key usk t [i] has at most d + 1 trapdoor matrices, and has bit-size
-The size of signature Σ is dominated by that of the Stern-like NIZKAoK Π, which is O(|ξ| · log q) · ω(log λ), where |ξ| denotes the bit-size of the witness-
Correctness. The correctness of the above scheme follows from the following facts: (i) the underlying argument system is perfectly complete; (ii) the underlying encryption scheme obtained by transforming the IBE scheme in [26] via CHK transformation [19] is correct. Specifically, for an honest user, when he signs a message at time period t, he is able to demonstrate the possession of a valid tuple ξ of the form (3). Therefore, with probability 1, the resulting signature Π will be accepted by the Verify algorithm, implied by the perfect completeness of the underlying argument system. As for the correctness of the Open algorithm, note that
where e 1 ≤ B, e 2 ∞ ≤ B, and
Hence
With probability 1, the Open algorithm will recover id and correctness of the Open algorithm holds. Security. In Theorem 2, we prove that our scheme satisfies the security requirements defined in Section 2.2. , c 1 , c 2 , Π, sig) such that ovk = ovk * , then C outputs a random bit and aborts the experiment. Now we argue that the probability that C aborts is negligible and hence Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Actually, before the challenged signature is given to A, ovk * is independent of A ′ s view, hence it is negligible that A queries a signature containing ovk * . Furthermore, after the challenged signature is sent to A, if A queries a new valid signature of the form (ovk * , c 1 , c 2 , Π, sig), then ((c 1 , c 2 , Π) , sig) is a successful forgery of the OT S scheme, which breaks the strong unforgeability of the OT S scheme. This proves that C aborts with negligible probability. From now on, we assume that A will not query valid signature containing ovk * .
Game 2: In this game, we change Game 1 in the following ways. First, instead of generating B using the TrapGen algorithm, we generate a uniformly random matrix B * over Z n×m q . This change is indistinguishable to A since the matrix B is statistically close to uniform by Lemma 2. Second, we program the random oracle H 0 as follows. For query of ovk * , it generates a uniformly random matrix G * ∈ Z n×ℓ q , let H 0 (ovk * ) = G * , and return G * to A. This change also makes no difference to A since the output of H 0 is uniformly random. For query of ovk = ovk * , we first sample
, let H 0 (ovk) = G = B * · F ovk mod q, and return G to A. We then keep a record of (ovk, F ovk , G) . G generated in this way is statistically close to uniform by Lemma 1. Hence, this change does not affect A's view non-negligibly. When A queries the opening oracle a signature (ovk, c 1 , c 2 , Π, sig) with ovk = ovk * , C can use the recorded F ovk to decrypt the ciphertext (c, c 2 ) . Hence C can answer all signature opening queries. It then follows that Game 2 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 3: In this game,we modify Game 2 as follows. Instead of generating a real proof Π * for the challenged signature, we generate a simulated one without using the witness by programming the random oracle H 1 . Since our argument system is statistically zero-knowledge, the view of adversary A is statistically indistinguishable between Game 3 and Game 2.
Game 4: In this game, we change Game 3 as follows. Instead of computing
in the challenged phase, where s ∈ χ n , e 1 ∈ χ m , e 2 ∈ χ ℓ , we let
where z * Proof. Assume there is a PPT adversary A attacking the forward-secure traceability of the forward-secure group signature scheme with non-negligible probability, then we construct a new PPT adversary B attacking the SIS
problem with non-negligible probability. Given a SIS instance C ∈ Z n×m q , the goal of B is to find a non-zero vector v ∈ Z m q such that C · v = 0 mod q and v ∞ ≤ 2β. Initially, B lets t = 0 and the set CU be empty and then proceeds as follows.
, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}. It then generates the remaining public parameters as in Section 3.1.
-Guess the targeted user i * ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} and targeted forgery time period t * ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1} uniformly.
-Generate a master key pair (B, S) via TrapGen(n, m, q).
B sets gpk, mosk honestly and sends them to A. At the start of each time period t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T − 1}, B announces the beginning of t to A. At current time period t, B responds to A's queries as follows.
-When A queries the random oracles H 0 , H 1 , B replies with uniformly random strings and keeps a record of the queries.
-When A queries the secret key of member i * , if i ∈ CU or t ≤ t * , B then aborts. Otherwise, for each node z ∈ Nodes (t→T −1) , it first computes the smallest index -When A queries the secret key of member i = i * , if i ∈ CU, B aborts. Otherwise, let id = Bin(i) and ℓ i be the smallest index such that 1 ≤ ℓ i ≤ ℓ and id
as in our construction and send it to A. Finally, add i to the set CU.
-When A queries a signature on a message for user i with i = i * and i / ∈ CU at current time t, B responds as in our algorithm Sign using the corresponding witness. For user i with i = i * and i / ∈ CU at current time t, B performs the same as in our algorithm Sign except that it generates a simulated proof Π ′ by programming the hash oracle H 1 and returns Σ = (ovk, c 1 , c 2 , Π ′ , sig) to A.
We claimed that A cannot distinguish whether it interacts with the real challenger or with B. First, group public key gpk given to A is indistinguishable from the real one. This is because the output matrix A of the TrapGen algorithm is statistically close to uniform by Lemma 2 and u is statistically close to a uniform vector over Z n q by Lemma 1. Second, the secret signing key given to A is indistinguishable from the real one due to the fact that the outputs of RandBasis using two different bases are within statistical distance by Lemma 5. Third, the signature queries make no difference to the view of A. This can be implied by the statistical zero-knowledge property of the underlying argument system.
When 
, since the probability of guessing this value is at most 3 −κ , which is negligible by our choice of κ.
, t * ) be the h-th oracle query and Q H1 be the total oracle queries A has made to H 1 . Next, B lets h be the targeted forking point and replays A polynomial-number times. For each new run, B starts with the same random tape and random input as in the original run. Further, for the first h − 1 queries of H 1 , B replies with the same random value as in the original run, but from h-th query on, B replies with fresh and independent value. Besides, for queries of H 0 , B always replies as in the original run.
Constructed in this way, (
is always the h-th oracle query A made to H 1 . The improved forking lemma [16] implies that with probability ≥ 
with pairwise distinct hash values CH
h , CH
h and corresponding valid responses RSP (1) h , RSP (2) h , RSP (3) h . A simple calculation shows that with probability 1 − (
κ , we have {CH
h,j , CH
h,j } = {1, 2, 3} for some j ∈ [κ]. Therefore, RSP (1) h,j , RSP (2) h,j , RSP (3) h,j are 3 valid responses for all the challenges 1, 2, 3 w.r.t. the same commitment CMT * j . Since COM is computationally binding, B is able to extract the witness tuple
where G * = H 0 (ovk * ). Conditioned on guessing correctly i * , t * , we have id = id * and z = z * . Therefore, A id z = C. Now we have C·v id z = u = C·z mod q. We claim that v id z = z with overwhelming probability. This is because A either queried the secret key of user id at time after t * or never queried the secret key at all (by successfully attacking forward-secure traceability), then z is not known to A. Further, from the view of the adversary, z is from the distribution D Λ u (C),s k and hence has large min-entropy, which are implied by Lemma 1.
Therefore, v id z = z with overwhelming probability. Hence x = v id z − z = 0 and x ∞ ≤ 2β. This implies that we solve the SIS ∞ n,m,q,2β problem with nonnegligible probability and hence our scheme is forward-secure traceable.
The Underlying Zero-Knowledge Argument System
In Section 4.1, we recall the extension, decomposition, and permutation techniques from [47, 37] . Then we describe in Section 4.2 our statistical ZKAoK protocol that will be used in generating group signatures.
Extension, Decomposition, and Permutation
Extensions. For m ∈ Z, let B 3m be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1} 3m having exactly m coordinates −1, m coordinates 1, and m coordinates 0 and S m be the set of all permutations on m elements. Let ⊕ be the addition operation modulo 2. Define the following functions
where n j is the number of element j in the vector v for j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Decompositions and Permutations. We now recall the integer decomposition technique. For any B ∈ Z + , define p B = ⌊log B⌋ + 1 and the sequence B 1 , . . . , B pB as B j = ⌊ 
This decomposition procedure is described in a deterministic manner as follows:
Next, for any positive integers m, B, we define the function vdec m,B that transforms a vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w m )
m to a vector of the following form: 
, then one can see that H m,B · w = w and for any ψ ∈ S 3mpB , the following equivalence holds:
Define the following permutation.
-For any e = (e 1 , . . . , e m )
One can see that, for any z, e ∈ {0, 1} m , the following equivalence holds:
The Underlying Zero-Knowledge Argument System
We now describe a statistical ZKAoK that will be invoked by the signer when generating group signatures. The protocol is developed from Stern-like techniques proposed by Ling et al. [47] and Langlois et al. [37] .
Public input γ:
with z = Bin(t).
Prover's goal:
We first rearrange the above conditions. Let
Since id is part of secret input, A id should not be explicitly given. We note that Langlois et al. [37] already addressed this problem. The idea is as follows: they first added ℓ suitable zero-blocks of size m to vector v id and then obtained the extended vector 
. Now one can check that equation (7) is equivalent to 
Using basic algebra, we can transform equations (8)and (9) Now we can use the decomposition and extension techniques described in Section 4.1 to handle our secret vectors. Let
We transform our secret vector w 0 to vector w = ( w 1 w 2 w 3 id) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} L of the following form:
Using basic algebra, we can form public matrix M such that
Up to this point, we have transformed the considered relations into equation of the desired form M · w = u mod q. We now specify the set VALID that contains the secret vector w, the set S and permutations {Γ φ : φ ∈ S} such that the conditions in (1) 
∈ B 3mp β ; -z 2 ∈ B 3dmp β and z 3 ∈ B 3(n+m+ℓ)pB ;
Clearly, our vector w belongs to the tailored set VALID. Based on the equivalences observed in (4) and (5) , it can be checked that if z ∈ VALID for some x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , then Γ φ (z) ∈ VALID for some x ⊕ e ∈ {0, 1} ℓ . In other words, the conditions in (1) hold, and therefore, we can run the interactive protocol described in Fig. 3 and obtains a statistical ZKAoK protocol.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} as a prediction of the challenge value that V will not choose. Receiving a challenge Ch from V, it responds as follows:
Case
-If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
-If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
-If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case we have considered above, since COM is statistically hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the challenge Ch from V are statistically close to those in the real interaction.
Hence, the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to that of the prover in the real interaction. In other words, we have constructed a simulator that can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly close to 2/3. Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that t w ∈ VALID; φ 2 = φ 3 ; t r = Γ φ3 (w 3 ); t w + t r = Γ φ2 (w 2 ) mod q;
Argument of
Since t w ∈ VALID, if we let w ′ = [Γ φ2 ] −1 (t w ), then w ′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have Γ φ2 (w ′ ) + Γ φ2 (w 3 ) = Γ φ2 (w 2 ) mod q, which implies that w ′ +w 3 = w 2 mod q, and that M·w ′ +M·w 3 = M·w 2 mod q. As a result, we have M · w ′ = u mod q. This concludes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
B Some Remarks on [33] (ePrint 2017/1128)
In [33] , Kansal, Dutta, and Mukhopadhyay proposed a forward-secure group signature scheme from lattices in the model of Libert and Yung [46] . Unfortunately, it can be observed that their proposed scheme does not satisfy the correctness and security requirements. The version of the scheme posted on 27-Nov-2017 15:26:21 UTC contains the following shortcomings.
-The scheme does not satisfy the correctness requirement. The opening algorithm, on input a signature generated by user i, does not output i. In fact, the transcript for user i stored by the group manager is transcript i = (v
i , i, uvk[i], sig i , [t 1 , t 2 ]). However, when signing messages at time t 1 + j with 0 < j ≤ t 2 − t 1 , the user i encrypts v (j) i , which is never seen by the group manager and which is unrelated to v i , which is part of the updated certificate and which should be kept secret. Therefore, two signatures generated by the same user at the same period can easily be linked. (Readers are referred to Page 24 (Update algorithm) and Page 27 (equation (13) ) in [33] for more details.)
We note that in an updated version of the scheme, posted on 18-Jan-2018 17:33:37 UTC, the signature does not contain matrix C (j) i , but the validity of the signature now cannot be publicly verified. That is because, in order to verify the underlying zero-knowledge argument system of Section 5 (Page 27), one needs to be given matrix C (j) idi that encodes the secret identity of the signer and that is not publicly known. In other words, this updated scheme also does not work.
